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ABSTRACT 
 
The election of U.S. President Donald J. Trump has taken everyone by surprise, 
including Trump himself.  Commentators initially expected him to be merely a flash in 
the pan, attracting attention but not a sustainable, serious contender.  When he 
became the forerunner in the Republican primaries, the conventional wisdom was 
that he would be handily defeated when the field narrowed to a manageable number, 
certainly when he faced a “regular” Republican. 
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RESUMO 
 
A eleição do presidente dos Estados Unidos Donald J. Trump tomou a todos de 
surpresa, incluindo o próprio Trump. Os comentaristas inicialmente esperavam que 
ele fosse apenas um flash na panela, atraindo atenção, mas não um competidor 
sustentável e sério. Quando se tornou o precursor nas primárias republicanas, a 
sabedoria convencional era que ele seria derrotado quando o campo se reduzisse a 
um número manejável, certamente quando enfrentava um republicano "regular". 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Eleição dos EUA; Republicano; Democrático. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The election of U.S. President Donald J. Trump has taken everyone by 
surprise, including Trump himself.  Commentators initially expected him to be merely 
a flash in the pan, attracting attention but not a sustainable, serious contender.  
When he became the forerunner in the Republican primaries, the conventional 
wisdom was that he would be handily defeated when the field narrowed to a 
manageable number, certainly when he faced a “regular” Republican.  The reluctant 
consolidation of the Republican “Establishment” around the roundly disliked Senator 
Ted Cruz, however, failed to halt Trump’s momentum, and he garnered the 
nomination and tepid support of his party.  Still, facing the experienced and highly 
competent, and battle hardened, Hillary Clinton, few thought the Trump campaign 
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could succeed, especially after tapes were released that showed him bragging about 
sexually assaulting women with impunity led many Republicans leaders to withdraw 
their support and his poll numbers to dip dramatically.  The race again tightened 
when the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced it was reopening its 
investigation into Clinton’s emails and the blow to Clinton’s campaign remained 
potent even when the FBI announced, mere days before the election, that it had 
found no evidence to justify continuing its investigation.  Nonetheless, the race ended 
with polls showing Clinton comfortably ahead and most commentary centered on 
whether she could garner an overwhelming, perhaps historic, victory sufficient to 
break the logjam immobilizing U.S. politics for the last six years.  The decisive victory 
for Trump in the Electoral College, although it is important to remember that he lost 
the popular vote by almost three million votes, befuddled most observersi and has 
professionals questioning their methods.ii      Trump’s victory was not 2016's only 
unanticipated, almost inexplicable, oddity.  The significant success of Senator Bernie 
Sanders’s campaign was as much a surprise on the left as Trump on the right.  When 
campaigning kicked off in 2015, most Americans had never heard of Sanders and 
were presumed unalterably hostile to any brand of socialism. The notion that 
Sanders, unaffiliated with any party, could attract more than a handful of votes in 
contested primaries against the unassailable Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party’s 
presumptive heir apparent, would have been dismissed as utopian speculation.  
Even Bernie entered the race with the intention not to win the nomination but to pull 
the debate to the left.iii   But Sanders’ achievement goes well beyond changing the 
conversation because he has shown that left (perhaps not socialist, since the 
Senator’s principle proposals have a more populist than socialist foundation, but they 
definitely fall outside the range of what has heretofore been considered viable planks 
in any imaginable political platform) ideas have traction.iv  Sanders polled over 12 
million votes, 46% of the votes cast in the Democratic contests (more than Trump 
received in winning the Republican nomination), and won 22 states in an steeply 
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uphill primary contest against Clinton, who had the nomination all but locked up 
before the contest began. 
 
 
 
 
CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS OF ELECTION 2016  
 
 With pundits still reeling from the shock of the election, a wide range of 
interpretations have emerged to explain the voting results.  One way to grasp the 
vigorous debate about why Trump won is to construct a typology of explanations 
ranged along an ideological scale: 
 On the right, conservatives interpret Trump’s triumph as victory for the people.  
The populist variant sees Trump was an anti-establishment rebel, representing the 
revolt of masses of “forgotten people” against elites of both parties, most especially 
toppling the detested Republican leadership. Ironically, that explanation squares with 
some liberal commentators; for example, Paul Krugman has argued that Republican 
leaders have been running a shell game since Ronald Reagan, appealing to their 
base on traditional socio/cultural issues but governing in favor of wealthy donors.  
Trump won because the base finally woke up, recognized the con game, and threw 
the grifters out.v  Meanwhile, the “establishment”  in both parties and especially in 
the media have rallied around the conservative narrative that “the system worked.”  
Reassuring Americans that the “peaceful transfer of power" is almost unique to this 
country and the main criteria for evaluating our democracy, these congratulatory 
conservatives resolutely overlook the anger and alienation apparent in the electorate 
as well as the extreme departure from normal governance on display during the 
transition period and first days of the new administration.  
  In the center, liberal interpretations reflect disappointment with the outcome, of 
course, and in addition, many liberals seem disappointed in American institutions or 
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voters. The faulty institutions interpretations maintain that Hillary would have won 
but for the malfunctioning of some critical institution.  Most prominently in line for 
condemnation is the Electoral College, of course, since Hillary did in fact win, the 
election if referring to the popular vote, but lost the official election because the 
outcome is determined by this holdover from the 18th century, a horse-and-buggy 
vote counting mechanism still relied on in the age of television, cell phones, and 
computers.  Another agency bitterly blamed by liberals is the FBI - either right-wing 
extremists within agency or its Republican director Comey.  Either way, the 
announcements of investigations into Hillary’s emails unarguably inflicted huge 
damage on her electoral chances and might have cost her the election.  Liberals also 
perceive the contemporary Republican Party as having deviated from the traditional 
mainstream of American politics.  Finally, resurrecting shades of the Cold War, many 
Democratic liberals are resuming their former roles as hardline anti-Communists and 
blaming Russian intelligence agencies for stealing the election.   Some disillusioned 
liberals go even further, blaming the election results on faulty voters.vi  Hillary would 
have won except for the racist, sexist, chauvinist, at best ignorant voters, who voted 
for Trump, a complaint that often targets the white male working class.  Though 
widespread, there are numerous pitfalls in explanations that judge white male 
workers as the chief culprit. Without denying that racism and intolerance are serious 
problems, it is not clear that such illiberal attitudes are uniquely strong in this group.  
Nor can it explain white male workers who voted for Obama deserted Hillary for 
Trump or why Hillary performed worse among women than Obama, or why Trump 
fared better with Latinos than Romney despite his provocative statements about 
Mexican immigrants. The biggest problem with this typically liberal methodological 
individualist interpretation is that even to extent is true, assuming that many voters 
are racist, sexist, etc., and that they voted their racism, sexism, etc., it understands 
those attitudes in individualistic, psychological terms and ignores questions about 
causation and consequences, about why these voters have these attitudes and what 
the implications are for politics. 
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On the left (and there is not much left that commands public attention in U.S. 
politics), more radical interpretations point to economic issues that tend to get 
conveniently ignored by mainstream pundits, which endows their analysis with a 
deeper, more sweeping critique of “the system.”   Some left explanations tend to 
blame policies, such as criticizing the strategic choices of the Democrats: the party 
picked the more conservative candidate, then she ran a campaign following a more 
conservative play book, attacking Trump as a deviant Republican (which did not help 
other Democrats running against regular Republicans) or stressing his personal  
disqualifications, despite the fact that her own personal negatives were greater than 
his, thus ignoring her own policy positions  and the need to give people positive 
reasons to vote for her.  More fundamentally, however, leftist critics blame the 
Democratic Party as far back as Jimmy Carter for abandoning the New Deal and 
adopting neoliberalism.  They note that many of the policies that have wreaked havoc 
on ordinary Americans, including many of Trump’s “forgotten people,” were initiated 
under Bill Clinton - NAFTA, sandbagging the social safety net, mass incarceration, 
financial deregulation - that led to disaster under Bush, and eight years of the Obama 
administration achieved only slow and partial success in undoing the damage.  So 
the Democrats as well as the Republicans bear some responsibility for the sad 
economic straits of much  of  the American  public and their consequent anger at the 
status quo expressed at the polls.vii     
  Some leftist interpretations focus on deeper critique of political economy, 
arguing that neoliberalism has corrupted the North American “system.”  Unions, for 
example, have been devastated in the neoliberal era.  White working class males, if 
unionized, vote Democratic, but union membership has fallen from nearly one-third to 
just 6% of the private workforce in the last four decades.  Now the main organizations 
mobilizing the working class is evangelical churches, the principal pillar of Republican 
power.  Campaign finance law has been undermined by Citizens United and other 
court cases reflecting neoliberal jurisprudence.viii  Media as well as more formal 
institutions of formal education for informing citizens, university as well as primary 
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and secondary education, have all succumbed to neoliberal hegemony.  
Globalization has aided corporations in exporting American manufacturing production 
and jobs abroad and redistributing income up to the top 1 percent of the 1 percent, 
while being rationalized as a natural force beyond human control by the corporate 
media.ix  So analysis on the left blame the neoliberal right turn in American politics, 
initiated by Ronald Reagan almost four decades ago, that moved the Democrats as 
well as the Republicans to the right of the political spectrum.  Since Hillary, like 
Barack Obama and her husband Bill, were all implicated in this neoliberal 
hegemony,x many voters turned to Trump, who at least symbolized change, led by an 
“outsider” to established, status quo politics and who offered some promise of 
breaking up the system.  
 None of the interpretations is entirely false.  On the contrary, all contain 
elements of valid explanation.  This article, however focuses on a different set of 
factors that are important in understanding the election of 2016 that led to the 
presidency of Donald Trump, namely that Trump’s victory represents in the most 
vivid imagery imaginable the decay of democratic political institutions in the United 
States.  One way to appreciate what such an alternative explanation can add to our 
understanding is to note that many of the explanations surveyed thus far rest on two 
highly problematic assumptions. 
 
 
MANDATES AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 First, many commentators view elections as the voice of the people, the 
occasion when the electorate is able to tell its leaders how it wishes to be governed.  
On this assumption, elections give leaders mandates to govern and set the direction 
for the country.  Votes, however, are literally silent actions, and they must be 
“translated,” that is, interpreted, to derive a message.  But can we know why people 
voted, what message they intended their vote to send?  Every candidate takes a 
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stand on many issues, but voters have only a single ballot to cast.  Which position 
won Trump voters’ support - the tough stance on immigration? the rejection of free 
trade? the promise to support Social Security and Medicare? the critique of 
Obamacare?  the more isolationist foreign problem?  Etc. With Trump, divining his 
appeal to supporters is particularly difficult because in a real sense Trump did not 
have policies or stances, but rather issued enigmatic and constantly shifting 
statements daily.  Some pundits even think that rather than any policy appeal, this 
mercurial style, combining tough sounding, “politically incorrect” rhetoric with totally 
inconsistent positions, was exactly the key to his winning votes. 
 Votes may be silent, but we can survey people to disclose their reasons for 
voting, but it is not easy to perceive much coherence or consistency in voter 
opinions, and their priorities and the intensity of various opinions may vary widely.  It 
can be erroneous to assume that issues salient to the campaign necessarily 
resonated with the candidate’s voters.  Even an issue as emblematic for the Trump 
campaign as “build the wall” actually failed to gain majority support from Trump 
voters, and Trump voters actually rank jobs much higher in importance than 
immigration.  Further undermining the usefulness of polling data to explain election 
results, polls measure only verbal responses to questions asked.  If the poll fails to 
ask perceptive questions, or if respondents do not give honest answers, or if 
respondents do not themselves know the real reasons for their own votes, that is, do 
not “know their own minds,” the meaning of their votes remains undiscovered.  All of 
these are real limitations.  For example, much racism in the U.S. nowadays is not 
overt, but subconscious, unbeknown to racists themselves, and even overt, self-
conscious racists are often too embarrassed to express explicitly racist attitudes. 
 Although professional pundits and the corporate media perpetually need to 
view elections as giving new presidents a mandate to govern, classic American 
political science studies of public opinion severely undermine the validity of this 
enterprise of trying to read messages in tea leaves of elections.  In the first place, 
Americans are notably non-ideological.  Phillip Converse maintained as long ago as 
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the 1960s that the public’s beliefs lacked internal consistency, and only a tiny handful 
of survey respondents could be rated as a having set of views sufficiently coherent to 
be labeled a political ideology.xi   
  In a 1966 book, Free and Cantril added a twist to this view of public opinion by 
arguing that Americans were oddly consistent in their inconsistency!  On issues 
pitched in abstract, ideological terms, Free and Cantril found that Americans were 
notably conservative.  For example, the public overwhelmingly supported broad 
generalized statements advocating smaller government, lower taxes, or fewer 
regulations.  At the same time, public sentiment solidly backed government programs 
that can only be considered liberal: more spending for schools, stronger regulations 
for public protection, more active measures to combat poverty and enhance 
opportunity.  Americans are, Free and Cantril concluded, ideological conservatives 
but operational (i.e., practical) liberals. xii   These old findings seem to hold water over 
time.  In a parallel study done in by Benjamin Page and Lawrence Jacobs, this 
striking ideological inconsistency, one could almost label it political schizophrenia, 
persists.xiii  
 Another complicating factor, one that might mitigate the view of ideological 
inconsistency, is populism.  One might even contend that many Americans do have a 
fairly consistent view of politics, but that these views are populist rather than liberal or 
conservative.  Populism, instead of falling on a neat left-right spectrum, views politics 
as a conflict between “the people” and “the elite.”  Authors such as John Judis, 
however, maintain that populism, however, is less a coherent ideology that a mood or 
stance, and complicates the analysis by arguing that populism itself can be divided 
into left and right variants, with left-wing populism pitting the bottom and middle 
classes against the elite, but with right-wing populists complicating this picture by 
accusing the elite of coddling a third group, often ending up scapegoating a weak 
minority group instead of attacking the nominal target of their ire, the elite.xiv  The 
existence of populist attitudes among a large swath of the public, with as many as 
half of Americans adhering to populist sentiments, can muddle the interpretation of 
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elections because it often goes unrecognized by the majority of academic 
researchers and commentators on public opinion who interpret all of politics on a 
liberal-conservative continuum. 
 One recent theory of American public opinion developed by Alan Abramowitz 
and Stephen Webster is the theory of negative partisanship.  In the past, researchers 
following in the footsteps of the Michigan voting studiesxv identified partisan 
identification as the primary explanation of voter choice -American voters’ decisions 
were influenced by their views on candidates and issues, but even these were filtered 
through their loyalties to party.  Partisan identification was the single strongest factor 
in vote choice.xvi  What Abramowitz and Weber discovered, however, is that 
nowadays many Americans’ partisanship is more negative than positive.  Using a 
“feelings thermometer,” they found that Americans are less attached to a party by 
warm feelings of loyalty that repelled by the other party by negative emotional 
valences.xvii  This negative partisanship helps explain why increasing numbers of 
people tell pollsters that they are voting against rather than for candidates. If Trump 
voters were mainly voting against Hillary, does that mean that his main mandate is 
simply don’t be Hillary?  But then even more, almost three million more, people voted 
against Trump - so the mandate of 2016 is that the President should not be Hillary, 
but also not be Trump!   
 This lack of mandate is reinforced by non-voting.  About 42% of the eligible 
voting age population did not vote at all. What were the abstainers trying to say with 
their silence?  Abstention is even harder to read than the act of voting.  Realizing that 
Trump and Clinton split the 58% of the eligible votes actually cast reduces Hillary’s 
share to approximately 30% of the eligible population, about 28% voting for Trump, 
and about 42% (non)“voting” for none-of-the-above.  Perhaps the main message 
being sent by about three-quarters of the American public to its new president is “we 
don’t want you.”   
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DEMOCRATIC DECAY 
 
 That rather startling conclusion highlights a second, even more deeply rooted 
assumption underlying much election commentary, namely, the firmly ingrained 
presumption that U.S. is a democracy.  To a great degree this reflects a widely 
accepted belief that democracy means a political system with elections.xviii  Even 
more superficial than this thin definition of democracy as elections, there is the 
mentally lazy American predisposition to equate democracy with American 
institutions.  This tendency can be observed in post-WWII American political science, 
whose equation of American polyarchy with democracy was dubbed revisionist 
democratic theory precisely because rather than employing a definition based on 
ideal concepts of democracy, such as popular sovereignty, liberty, and equality, it 
revised the definition of democracy by deriving it from existing American practices.  
Media commentary and conventional wisdom follow a similar path: democracy simply 
means “the way we do things in the U.S.”  For example, separation of powers must 
be democratic because it is a key principle of American constitutionalism, even 
though it inhibits popular sovereignty and exacerbates inequality.xix   This sloppy 
thinking shades easily, especially in the media and on the right, into shallow 
celebrations of the status quo, inertial resistance to reform, e.g., of the Electoral 
College, and chauvinist paeans to America as “the world’s greatest democracy,” 
despite comparative research that rates American institutions as only a middling 
democracy.xx 
 Instead of trying to interpret the intentions of voters in the 2016 election, this 
article focuses on American political institutions.  Its thesis is that Trump does not 
represent a bout of temporary insanity or a dark stain on the American psyche but is 
rather a symptom of the decadence of our political institutions.  Our pluralist 
democratic politics, a combination of liberal politics and dynamic capitalism, that 
reached its zenith in the flourishing in the post-WWII era, has been struggling since 
the 1970s, both politically and economically.  What the 2008 economic crisis 
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highlighted about changes to the American economy, the bankruptcy of financialized 
capitalism, has now been matched in the political realm by Trump’s taking the stage 
in the 2016 elections: the bankruptcy of a political system that functioned reasonably 
well for an exceptional epoch in US history but now seems outmoded and incapable 
of addressing the pressing problems facing the nation.  American political institutions, 
always only thinly democratic when measured against democratic ideals of popular 
sovereignty, liberty, and equality, now stand revealed as in a sad state of decay.  As 
Al Smith advocated, however, the best cure for the failings of democracy is more 
democracy.xxi 
 
 
“ROTTEN BOROUGHS": UNREPRESENTATIVENESS IN THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE, THE U.S. SENATE, AND GERRYMANDERED DISTRICTS 
 
 The most obvious failed institution from a democratic perspective is the 
Electoral College.  For the second time in this century (the first being the 2000 
election of George W. Bush despite a half million receiving fewer actual votes than Al 
Gore), the Electoral College has produced a winner at odds with the popular vote for 
president (Hillary Clinton won almost three million more votes than Trump).  If its 
democratic pedigree was questionable at its origin,xxii the raison d’etre of the EC as a 
vote counting mechanism is highly dubious today, when mechanized voting and 
computers could produce a much more accurate tally.  The misrepresentation stems 
from two mechanisms.  First, electoral votes are allocated on the basis of each 
state’s representation in Congress.  The number of representatives in the House 
roughly reflects population, but each state has two Senators, regardless of 
population.  This basis over-represents less populous states.  Second, all but two 
(Maine and Nebraska) states cast their votes according to the “unit rule” - all electors 
vote for the winner of a plurality of popular votes in their state, meaning that the 
division of electoral votes can deviate from the split in popular votes if vote margins 
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are uneven across states.  Usually the winning margin of the top vote-getter is 
exaggerated in the Electoral College, arguably conferring additional legitimacy on the 
winner, but the election of candidates with only a minority of votes has happened five 
times.  More serious potential for breakdown lies if no candidate receives an absolute 
majority of electoral votes.  The election of president then evolves on the House of 
Representatives, where the constitutional workings of the system become murky.  No 
such extraordinary event has occurred since the 19th century, but the potential for 
chaos and confusion lurks in the background. 
 Some defenders of the Electoral College maintain that despite formally over-
representing small, rural states, the actual political bias of the system favors large, 
urban states, at least if they are competitive.  Candidates favor “battleground states,” 
with significant numbers of electoral votes in play, with time, resources, and attention 
especially since the winner take all unit rule exaggerates the impact of these large, 
competitive states’ votes.  Most other arguments for the Electoral College either are 
patently false, circular, or shade into mysticism.  The real reasons for its continual 
existence, despite its frequent and potentially disastrous malfunctioning, are inertia - 
it is almost impossible to amend the Constitution, and the bias to two partyism built 
into the system.xxiii   
 Recently the Senate has been the target of sharp criticism for its 
unrepresentativeness.  With each state having two Senators, regardless of 
population, a coalition of approximately 25 small states with a minority of the national 
population could conceivably its policy preferences on the rest of the nation.  More 
plausibly, especially given the Senate filibuster rules,xxiv Senators from a very small 
number of states, e.g., 12, with a tiny portion of the U.S. population, perhaps as low 
as 20%, can effectively hold legislation hostage, threatening to block it entirely and at 
least shaping it to the minority will.xxv  Arguably this happened to President Obama’s 
health care reform, where a few strategically situated Senators (with their power 
augmented even further by holding committee chairships based on seniority) from 
small, rural states reshaped key provisions in more conservative ways.xxvi   
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 Gerrymandering, the process of drawing district lines to favor the election of 
incumbents or representatives of a particular party, is an old American practice, but 
with the advent of sophisticated election data and computers to aid analysis, partisan 
district design is moving from an art to a science.  Consequently, few districts in the 
U.S. House (or in state legislatures) are truly competitive.  The rate of incumbency, 
despite political leaders’ constant pandering to electoral considerations, is 
astronomical; in recent decades, more than 90% of Representatives who choose to 
stand for re-election return to Congress.  Depending on different definition of 
competitiveness (for example, districts that divide their vote more evenly than 60 to 
40%, or elections won by less than 10%), estimates argue that fewer than 15% of 
elections for the House are competitive, or assert that only about 35 House seats are 
actually at stake in a national election for 435 House seats.  When the vast bulk of 
seats are “safe,” it is difficult to claim that elections register public opinion, and a 
change of national policy direction faces strong barriers in the form of an entrenched, 
partisan bias. xxvii 
 
 
GRIDLOCK 
 
 To understand frustration that produced an electoral victory for Donald Trump 
(as well as the astounding success of Bernie Sanders in Democratic primaries) one 
must grasp is the extraordinary stalemate that has gripped American politics in recent 
years.  Various diagnoses locate the fault in different places, ranging from the decline 
of “comity” in Congress to a loss of civility among the public, with various factors 
bearing the blame.  The most prominent diagnosis of American political deadlock 
lately comes from Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, two Washington-based, very 
mainstream political  scientists whose views are so noteworthy precisely because of 
their conservatism - their views have long epitomized the “inside the beltway 
Washington Establishment” thinking.  Both have long careers working for elite, even 
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ideologically conservative, organizations and defending American political institutions 
and the pluralist democratic model as the most realistic approximation of the 
democratic ideal possible.  Today, however, they have reached the opposite 
conclusion, embodied in the titles of their book: It’s Even Worse than It Looks (and 
let’s face it, most observers think it looks pretty bad!), now revised with a title that 
reflects an even more dire assessment, It’s Even Worse than It Was!xxviii  These two 
pillars of the “Establishment” argue that the U.S. political system is dysfunctional 
because of a mismatch of constitutional structure and contemporary American 
political parties.  The constitutional system, based principally on various checks and 
balances, requires consensus, cooperation, and compromise to work, but our current 
parties are more like the ideological parties of parliamentary systems than the old 
presidential coalition parties. These non-ideological “big tent” parties were mainly 
vote-seeking vehicles that sought broad support to win elections and welcomed all 
regardless of agreement on policy.  Once in office, these electoral machines turned 
into pragmatic governing coalitions producing moderate, often bipartisan legislation in 
order to gain support for re-election.  Nowadays, however, parties have been 
transformed into a more parliamentary mold: they run on ideologically extreme 
platforms, appealing to relatively narrow electoral bases, and in office, adhere to rigid 
platforms seeking to maintain ideological purity, resulting in polarization and 
“permanent campaigns” rather than post-election pragmatic governing.  
 What has garnered unusual media attention for this academic book is the 
(conservative) authors’ claim that the polarization is asymmetrical, mostly the fault of 
the Republicans who have become much more extreme than the more moderate 
Democrats.  Although the media blame both parties equally for the rigidity and the 
gridlock plaguing Washington, Mann and Ornstein label this “false balance,” a 
misplaced attempt to maintain the media’s posture of fairness in the public eye as 
well as its professional norm of objectivity defined as presenting both sides (sic) of 
issues.    
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 The asymmetrical parties thesis seems to reflect political realities rather than 
merely biases of (conservative!) observers.  Grossman and Hopkins argue that the 
two major parties are different kinds of political animals.  The Republicans, they find, 
are a much more ideological party.  Democrats, on the other hand, are a groups-
benefits type of electoral machine.  In other words, the Democrats have made a 
much less radical transformation from the old-style big tent parties in which politicians 
sought broad popular support not on the basis of ideologically consistent platforms 
but by providing pragmatic benefits (“bringing home the bacon”) to their base  
constituencies.xxix  Moreover, this asymmetrical party thesis comports with the 
campaign strategies of the two parties.  Faced with a public opinion bifurcated 
between ideological conservatism and pragmatic liberalism, as Free and Cantril 
described, Republicans run on abstract ideology, explains why their campaign 
speeches so often string together empty clichés.  Democrats, on the other hand, win 
by proposing pragmatic policies to solve concrete problems, explaining why 
Democratic leaders’ speeches often are laundry lists of ideas devised by policy 
wonks, certainly more workable as public policy, but often uninspiring as political 
rhetoric.  
 Paul Krugman contends that the dramatic success of Trump’s challenge to the 
Republican Establishment as opposed to the relative success of the Democratic 
Party Establishment in withstanding the Sanders challenge reflects this party 
difference.  Republican leaders, he asserts, have provided little real benefits to their 
loyal voters in recent decades, opening space for Trump to triumph by offering a real 
“win” as opposed to vacuous ideological clichés to his followers.  On the Democratic 
side, in contrast, base constituencies stayed loyal to the Establishment candidate, 
with minorities and women overwhelmingly sticking with Hillary despite Sanders’ 
vigorous denunciation of the status quo, because Democratic leaders have in fact 
pushed policies that resulted in real, if not dramatic, gains for these loyal Democratic 
groups.xxx 
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POLITICAL PARTIES IN DECAY 
 
 The US has had, almost from its origins (the constitution was ratified in 1787, 
but parties did not develop until the second administration of President George 
Washington), a two-party system.  Political scientists and historians often divide 
American electoral history into various (six or seven – the topic is controversial) 
different periods or party systems.  The different partisan eras, each lasting roughly a 
political generation or about 40 or 50 years, are normally characterized by a stable 
majority party and a smaller, but still significant, minority party. The majority party 
usually dominates most presidential elections, a majority of seats in Congress, and a 
majority of state and local governments, although it is not unusual to have some 
regions controlled by the majority. The minority is not without hopes of winning 
elections, usually winning a couple of presidencies, especially when it recruits 
unusually appealing candidates or when the majority suffers from problems dealing 
with important issues.  Periotic realigning or critical elections are seen as creating 
electoral earthquakes that shift the ground between majority and minority parties, 
producing new majorities (or new alliances of groups within and between the two 
parties). 
 The clearest example of a realignment occurred in reaction to the Great 
Depression.  The Republicans, who had been the majority party since the Civil War 
with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, were perceived as insufficiently 
energetic in combating the economic crisis under President Herbert Hoover.  In 1932, 
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt was elected President, and after enacting a package of 
restorative measures labeled the New Deal, was re-elected in a landslide with 
overwhelming Democratic majorities in the Congress as well.  The New Deal 
Democratic coalition was a hodgepodge: labor, urban machines, ideological liberals, 
minorities, Catholics, and most problematically, the white South. Not for nothing 
beloved comic Will Rogers famously said, “I belong to no organized political party.  
I’m a Democrat.”  Republicans came to represent those social forces opposed to the 
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liberal government activism of the New Deal, mainly business, the North and 
MidWest, the middle class, whites, and Protestants, but especially after WWII, with a 
social pact between labor and business, prosperity reigned in a system of mass 
production and mass production dubbed Fordism, and Democratic majorities 
stabilized.  
 With the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Democratic 
coalition, always in tension, came unglued, as the national Democratic party, 
dependent on black votes in the North, led in legislating against the Jim Crow 
segregation of the South.  Southern white voters flirted first with Goldwater, then 
migrated temporarily to third party challenge of Wallace, then entered the Republican 
party on the heels of Nixon’s Southern Strategy.  Republicans appealed not only to 
Southern whites but also to the Northern working class, especially urban ethnic 
groups feeling status threat from the centrality of blacks as an emerging new 
Democratic constituency.  But status, ethnicity, and racism were not the only factors 
at work.  LBJ’s War on Poverty emphasized means-tested programs targeted for 
minorities and the poor as opposed to the New Deal’s universal safety net programs 
that included the middle and working classes, and some policies seemed to directly 
challenge the bases of working class prosperity.  For example, anti-poverty programs 
mobilized marginalized minorities to unseat the ethnic-based urban machines that 
had provided social progress for immigrants.  Affirmative action policies pitted liberals 
and civil rights groups, anxious to aid social mobility for minorities, against unions; 
many white workers felt excluded from the special preferences granted to blacks.  A 
politics of ethnic division displaced politics based on class solidarity.xxxi  
 As social issues became more prominent that economic issues, Republicans 
increasingly succeeded in framing not just integration and racial issues in the South 
but national issues as matters of law and order, preservation of traditional or family 
values, respect for morality and human life. Many political scientists felt that the 
realignment due at the end of the 1960s, after a generation of Democratic 
dominance, was occurring with Nixon’s landslide re-election in 1972.  Watergate 
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intervened, however, retarding Republican gains, which seeped down gradually from 
the national to local offices, prompting some to speak of a split level realignment.xxxii  
Only when the rise of Religious Right brought evangelicals into conservative political 
movement, who cemented an alliance with Republican Party under Reagan, did the 
realignment seem realized and Republican hegemony seem sealed. 
 The new Republican party, with its expanded base, like the New Deal 
Democrats before them, was composed of groups that made for strange bedfellows.  
The business class, variously labeled country club or Wall Street Republicans (“the 
Establishment”) traditionally provided Republicanism with its electoral foundations 
and retained its predominant position within the party.  On the other hand, the 
Religious Right (“Evangelicals") became numerically more important, providing most 
of the votes for Republican candidates; these lower middle or working class voters 
were often referred to as Main Street Republicans or simply as “the base.”  
Republican leaders have been drawn mainly from the Establishment, but the most 
successful Republican politicians, for example, Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush, have but able to cobble together all the diverse groups within the party.  
Candidates seen as representing only one faction have had less success, e.g., 
George H. W. Bush and Mitt Romney, 
 Many observers have noted that Trump is a master salesperson; in fact, one 
major criticism is exactly that he is a charlatan, a master of illusions. Paul Krugman, 
however, points out that the leadership of the Republican Party has been running a 
shell game for years.xxxiii  Its candidates have emphasized cultural and social issues - 
anti-abortion, advocacy of school prayer and public displays of (Christian) religion, 
opposition to gay marriage - when convenient to motivate the base and turn out 
religious conservative voter.  Once in office, however, these successful politicians 
have rarely fulfilled their promises (sometimes because they required constitutional 
revision, but little political capital to effect changes).  The focus of Republicans when 
governing was always pro-business policies, tangible benefits for the Wall Street 
wing of party.  But these policies, such as free trade deals, tax policies encouraging 
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the offshoring of jobs or deindustrialization, favorable tax rates for the wealthy, etc., 
are of little benefit to the base, and actually work against the interests of most 
Republican voters.  
In What’s The Matter With Kansas,  Thomas Frank provocatively proposed 
that social issues were blinding  middle and working class Americans to their 
economic interests, enabling the Republicans to woo especially religious right voters 
based on their social and cultural conservatism even though GOP policies hurt these 
voters’ pocketbooks.xxxiv  If Democrats have famously “run left and governed right,” 
the Republicans played the opposite game; they ran as populists, but governed as 
elitists.   
 Ironically, this ruse may be true not only of economic policy of also hold true 
for the issue that seems to most animate Trump supporters, migration. The liberal 
trade pacts Trump castigates are products of bipartisan support, and while Trump 
promises to restore American’s country to them by building a wall against illegal 
immigration and blames the Obama administration for failing to stop the flow of illegal 
immigrants, NAFTA, championed by Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) as Speaker of the 
House in coalition with President Bill Clinton, may bear much responsibility for 
stimulating massive immigration from Mexico.  NAFTA knocked down barriers to 
cheap corn from MidWest, where industrialized agriculture dependent on large farms, 
mechanized production, genetically modified seeds, and petro-fertilizers, all 
undergirded by government subsidies to agri-business, yielded massive amounts of 
cheap corn that flooded Mexican market. Small Mexican farmers, unable to compete 
with this tide of corporatized corn, lost their farms and were driven off their land - and 
north to the U.S.xxxv   U.S. foreign policies, such as anti-Communist intervention in 
Southeast Asia and Central American, and now the War on Terror championed by 
the Republican Party, blindly championed by Republican leaders, have contributed to 
the waves of immigration that the Trump constituency so resents. 
 If Trump represents a rebellion in the Republican ranks by previously sleeping 
masses now awakened by rage against not merely Democratic policies but also 
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economic and foreign policies of their own party, some Democrats are also feeling 
used by their party elites, a discontent that burst to the surface with the Sanders 
campaign.  Although President Obama remains popular within the party, the 
progressive wing registered its disenchantment with the lack of change promised by 
the Democratic standard-bearer in 2008 and again in 2012.  Certainly the 
Republicans received the bulk of the blame; their Senate leader Mitch McConnell set 
Republican strategy by pledging from day one to defeat the new president by 
blocking every initiative that he proposed. Progressive Democrats, however, could 
not judge their party leaders entirely innocent.  The party, at least since the New 
Democrats assumed leadership under Bill Clinton in the 1990s, had been under sway 
of Reagan’s neoliberal hegemony.  For example, Clinton had pushed NAFTA and 
other free trade treaties, and Obama himself was the chief advocate of the 
TransPacific Partnership.  Bill Clinton had pronounced that “The era of big 
government is over,” and even acknowledged that “We’re all Eisenhower 
Republicans here."xxxvi  Obama had followed Bush's lead in carrying out the post-
2008 bank bailout, perhaps a necessary evil to save the financial system, but it was 
unaccompanied by comparable policies to bail out foreclosed homeowners, 
distressed consumers, or the unemployed.xxxvii  After the Republican swing in the 
2010 elections, he had also pursued an even more bipartisan path, prioritizing 
austerity in budget deals and reigning in entitlements in hopes of a budget-balancing 
deal with conservatives.   
 The middle classes, especially the working class, are suffering from this 
neglect; in fact, as talk of the dying or disappearing middle class became more 
common, startling new research revealed that the working class is literally dying.  
Unlike the trends for all other major social groups, death rates for white working class 
members were increasing.  Many of the additional deaths could be attributed to 
alcohol, drugs, and suicide - causes that were said to reflect an “epidemic of despair” 
among white middle and lower income workers who felt neglected and abandoned to 
despair.xxxviii      
Revista Jurídica                     vol. 04, n°. 45, Curitiba, 2016. pp.442-476 
                                                                       DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.4667536  
  _________________________________________ 
 
463 
 
 Thomas Frank, who in What’s The Matter with Kansas had earlier blasted 
Republicans for defrauding working class voters by appealing to their social 
conservatism and evangelical religiosity while neglecting their economic interests, 
now wrote Listen Liberal (one wag suggested that it would be better subtitled What’s 
the Matter with Massachusetts) lambasting the Democrats for making themselves 
over as the party of the professional classes while ignoring the needs of the working 
class, a traditional pillar of the New Deal coalition.xxxix  The neoliberal policies have 
been hard on the entire working class, of course, but white workers may be 
particularly alienated from the Democrats.  Liberals have been diligent in recent 
decades of advocating diversity (often perceived by dominant groups such as whites, 
males, and heterosexuals as meaning advocacy for traditionally underrepresented 
groups but as neglecting, or even condemning, them) and opposed discrimination, 
but such laudable stances can often foster identity politics and at best address 
discrimination while neglecting inequality per se.xl 
   The reasons for the American two party system are legion.  Besides the inertia 
of tradition, there is the strength of party loyalty.  There is also the force of self-
fulfilling prophesy: money, media attention, momentum all flow to parties perceived to 
have a chance of winning.  Most important, the “wasted vote syndrome” deters voters 
from casting ballots for third party candidates who seem to have no chance of 
winning, especially since in essence this decision represents a vote for one’s least 
favored candidate by depriving one’s second choice of support.  U.S. electoral laws, 
inherited from Britain, enforce this wasted vote syndrome.  By electing only one 
representative from each district (and the presidential electors are elected as a single 
unit from each state) based on a winner-take-all formula, single-member plurality 
vote counting systems push diverse groups of voters into just two formal parties, as 
opposed to alternative voter systems, such as proportional representation, used in 
most countries.xli   
 Notice that historically there has always been two parties but not same two 
parties.  In fact, the Republican Party was founded as a third party in the 1840s, but 
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displaced one of the then major parties, the Whigs, before the Civil War. While 
creating a sustainable and significant third party challenger is unrealistic as viable 
long run option, it is not unimaginable that a new party might successfully out-
compete one of the current two major parties and take its place in what could remain 
a two-party system.  Before the 2016 elections, the Republican Party seemed the 
more vulnerable to challenge from either a moderate centrist newcomer (for example, 
there was speculation that ex-NY Mayor Michael Bloomberg might run as an 
independent) or from a dissident group representing a disgruntled Republican base 
had Trump been denied the nomination.  With the Democrats is disarray after the 
election, it is not unthinkable that the party could split into rival factions based on the 
Clinton and Sanders campaigns from the spring 2016 primaries, with only one 
winning the contest to be one of the two major parties.  Although these scenarios of a 
major party falling victim to a third party challenger, the more likely prospect is the 
more historically normal pattern of political contestation being contained within the 
confines of the Republican and Democratic Parties.  As a footnote, however, it is 
notable that the theory of negative partisanship propounded by Abramovitz and 
Webster, which finds that voting is based increasingly on growing repulsion toward 
the opposing party, does seem to open some space for a third party to emerge and 
displace either of two parties whose voter support is based less on positive attraction 
that on distaste for alternative.  At the least, it indicates potential for rebellions within 
each party. 
INTEREST GROUPS  
 
 While most media commentators and the public assume that elections 
determine public policy because the U.S. is a democracy, recent studies have called 
this electoral politics model into question.  the discovery that shook this model to the 
core was Thomas Piketty’s work on inequality: not just the type of inequality that is 
arguably hollowing out the middle class in the U.S., leading to a growing gulf 
between the poor and working poor versus the affluent, but a more extreme form of 
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inequality in which the top 1%, in fact a tiny percentage of the top 1%, are increasing 
their vast wealth at the expense of the 99%.xlii  Political scientists Jacob Hacker and 
Paul Pierson have argued persuasively that this kind of super-inequality cannot be 
explained by economic factors such as globalization or digitalization alone, but rather 
result from changed policies such as taxes, financial deregulation, corporate 
governance/CEO pay, and industrial relations.  They maintain that election results do 
not explain these policies that so dramatically redistributed income and wealth 
upwards since 1980; it is implausible that voters would have chosen policies that 
favored the 1% at their expense, besides which these trends have occurred under 
both Democratic and Republican administrations.  Hacker and Pierson instead 
propose that to understand such trends we need to conceive of politics as “organized 
combat” between various conflicting interests.   
 Their explanation then involves a historical account of group politics in recent 
decades.  They contend that the 1960s saw the mobilization of many social 
movements seeking reforms, all of which cost business money and reduced profits.  
In the early 1970s, Lewis Powell (later to serve on the Supreme Court) wrote a now-
famous memo to the Chamber of Commerce advocating that business undertake a 
campaign to combat its flagging position in society.  These steps amounted to a 
counter-attack to defend business interest waged notably at the level of ideas, 
intended to reestablish capitalist hegemony (through the establishment of university 
chairs, think tanks, funded research, and friendly media – an idea that eventually led 
to the founding of Fox News.  Business also bolstered its lobbying efforts, opening 
offices in Washington, undertaking public relations campaigns on public issues, and 
donating massive amounts to candidates.  Simultaneously, organizations 
representing the poor and middle classes entered a decline. Unions faced a hostile 
atmosphere and hemorrhaged members.  Other liberal groups continued to be active 
in the “organized combat” of pluralist politics, but their focus subtly shifted more to 
issues of representation and identity and away from economic matters.  As Hacker 
and Pierson describe the result, “Mass-membership organizations representing the 
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economic interests of voter from the middle to the bottom of the economic ladder, 
always weak, have atrophied further, while the capacity of employers, other 
business-linked interests, and the affluent in general has greatly increased.” The 
redistribution of income and wealth, in other words, followed this redistribution of 
political power among the organized interest groups in American society.xliii    
 
MONEY, MEDIA, AND MANAGEMENT: A 3M POLITICS 
 
 W. Lance Bennett has argued that the trends in American electoral politics 
reflect the growing influence of money, media, and management.  In other words, the 
traditional means of mobilizing voters depended on party organizations, and to some 
extent on various civil society organizations such as clubs, unions, and churches, to 
influence public opinion on issues and elections as well as to motivate, and even 
physically transport, voters to the polls.  It was a labor intense operation, putting a 
premium on organized number of people.  Bennett argues that these “people” 
organizations have been losing ground to the influence of campaign donations, mass 
media, especially television, and professionalized campaign management by political 
consultants.  He notes that all are capital intensive, and thus that these shifts in 
campaigning style amount to a redistribution upward to those with, or with access to, 
financial resources.  He also notes that this type of electoral politics facilitates 
campaigns that tend to be strong on image, even fluff and illusion, rather than 
substance.  Thus he claims that the work of actual governance is increasingly 
severed from election, perhaps explaining the sense of frustration that many  
Americans feel that their government, though elected by them, is unresponsive to 
their needs and demands.xliv 
 The rise of big money’s influence in American politics has attracted the most 
attention and criticism.  Especially after the Citizens United decision opened the way 
to unlimited campaign spending by corporations, observers have decried the 
“financialization of politics.”  The sheer growth in the amount of money contributed by 
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the affluent to campaigns can only be described as obscene.  Whereas in 1980 the 
riches 0.01% of the population gave 10% of campaign money, today they supply 
40%.  The most affluent 10% supply 83% of money donated to campaigns.xlv  In 
other words, political candidates are dependent on funds to mount campaigns on a 
narrow sliver of the population, the very richest.  Charles and David Koch, who 
inherited their father’s oil business, have drawn the most attention.xlvi It was widely 
reported that the Koch Brothers and their wealth friends were amassing a campaign 
chest of almost $900 million to influence the 2016 election, and amount equal to what 
each of the two major parties was hoping to spend in the election – a development 
that prompted some observers to claim that the U.S. had at last become a three-
party system, consisting of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the 
Billionaires Party!  This financialization of politics is undermining public faith in 
American government: in 1964, 29% of Americans believed their government favored 
moneyed interests, but today that suspicion is credited by 80% of the public.xlvii  
 Mass media also loom large in explaining elections in contemporary America.  
Donald Trump is not our first media star leader; Ronald Reagan was a Hollywood 
actor.  But Trump is the first reality TV star to assume high political office, and some 
argue that the style of his presidency, at least in its initial stages, reflects nothing so 
much as the brusque and somewhat chaotic atmosphere of his show, “The 
Apprentice.”  In fact, it may not be too farfetched that Trump’s ascendency 
represents the coming to fruition of the thesis of Neal Gabler, whose  Life: The Movie  
argued that life was imitating art and that politics (as were other facets of American 
life, including our own individual biographies) was becoming more and more like a 
movie.xlviii Certainly the focus of politics increasingly resembles the chief content of 
mass media: entertainment. 
 To a great degree this trend simply reflects the ownership of the media; about 
six corporate conglomerates own the bulk of media ranging from television to radio to 
movies to publishing.  Certainly the rise of social media has decentralized and 
democratized communications – we witness this phenomenon in the documentation 
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of police brutality in videos filmed on cell phones, leading to the Black Lives Matter 
movement.  But social media giants Google, Facebook, as well as Google and 
Microsoft are also profit seeding, and incredibly profitable, corporations.  Corporate 
news organizations tend to cover what sells, e.g., celebrities. Jay Leno once noted 
that politics was show business for ugly people, but the “beautiful people” play an 
increasingly prominent role in today’s politics.   
 Scandals also sell newspapers, and so coverage of scandals occupies a 
central place in political reporting.  One especially eye-opening study contrasted 
American’s knowledge of Bill Clinton’s sex scandals compared to their knowledge of 
his policies.  The startling finding was that Americans were exceedingly well informed 
about detailed aspects of the Lewinsky affair, with about two-thirds of the public able 
to answer over 80% of specific questions about the scandal, but they were 
uninformed about most of Clinton’s key policy positons, with only about 20% of 
respondents able to correctly identify his stance on even half the queries about 
policies.  Not only were the people questioned uninformed, but they were 
misinformed.  The tended to correctly identify Clinton’s policies when they conformed 
to his liberal image, but they misperceived his stances when he was more 
conservative.  The researches attributed this result to the media’s reliance on 
simplistic labeling (there are virtually not terms used besides liberal or conservative in 
American political reporting) and the use of a game frame for stories – since Clinton’s 
Republican “opponents” were described as conservative, respondents deduced that 
Clinton’s “team” had to be liberal.xlix 
 Use of a game (or strategic) frame to narrate news also embodies an 
approach that seeks to attract and entertain rather than inform.  Elections are framed 
as horse races, with most reportage focusing on who is ahead.  Even the governing 
process is portrayed as a simple struggle for power and scoring points rather than a 
serious attempt to set policies and directions.  Treating audiences as spectators 
keeps them focused on which political forces are winning, but deprives them of 
information useful to them as citizens about which leaders and programs to back, 
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contributing to passivity.  Arguably, the game frame also contributes to cynicism 
about politics, which reinforces apathy and non-involvement, because it perpetuates 
a picture of politics as a struggle for power for the selfish ends of winning.l  
 Another poisonous effect of the corporate media has been identified as the 
“Fox effect”: Fox News’ success in the ratings wars has arguably pulled other media 
toward its model of conservative and arguably bogus journalism.  This impact was on 
full effect this past election as CNN dramatically increased its viewership by following 
Fox’s focus on Trump.li  Fox’s “in-your-face” style of competing, often yelling, “talking 
heads” has not only influenced other news outlets’ coverage but also may be 
increasing the incivility of American political dialogue, paving the way for less 
deliberative democracy and for candidates like Trump who thrive on outrageous but 
attention commanding rhetoric, and also diminishing the legitimacy of opposing 
positions.lii  Social media, as an alternative channel to the corporate mass media for 
communicating among the public, is seen by some as a hopeful development, but 
critics argue the positive effects may be largely empty dreams while the negative 
consequences of fragmentation of information sources and reinforcement of closed, 
often extreme, thinking seem to be inflicting untold harm to deliberative politics today.  
Trump is very much the product of what Kathleen Hall Jamieson dubbed “the echo 
chamber” whereby news sources, principally from the far right, not only become the 
single trusted source of information but also pre-emptively brand alternative fonts of 
views and news as biased and untrustworthy.  The impenetrability of the echo 
chamber, for example, helps explain the immunity from criticism among his 
supporters seemingly enjoyed by Trump as well as the shocking efficacy of false 
news reports in this election, convincing many insulated citizens of otherwise 
transparently implausible “truths” about Hillary Clinton and the Democrats.liii   
 Obviously politics has in a sense always been a con game, and campaigns 
have been understood as marketing exercises aimed at “selling” candidates at least 
since Joe McGinniss’ inside expose of the 1968 Nixon campaign.liv  Today’s 
campaigns are staffed and directed by a host of professional managers and 
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consultants, public relations experts and advertising specialists, and pollsters, 
arguably exerting more influence that the candidates themselves.  These marketing 
strategies can lend an air of artificiality to electoral politics and divorce the choice of 
leaders from the art of governing.  By making candidates more dependent on 
campaign financing, it diminishes the influence of and accountability of parties and 
enhances the strength of wealthy donors and interest groups.  By further fragmenting 
politics, it reinforces constitutional fragmentation and makes consensus and thus 
change even more difficult.  Finally, it deepens the public’s cynicism that politics is 
merely a self-aggrandizing game and that issues of governance are merely illusory.  
Ironically, despite being a professional reality TV entertainer and past master at 
branding, Trump benefited from the perceived amateurishness of his style.  By 
defying the norms of how established politicians should act and professional 
campaigns should be run, he appealed to his populist base as somehow more 
authentic and trustworthy than other candidates.lv  
 
LOW PARTICIPATION 
 
 Voting is the easiest for of political participation, yet turnout in American 
elections is notoriously low compared to comparable democracies.  While voting 
routinely exceeds 80 or 90% in many countries, the turnout rate in U.S. presidential 
elections has hovered between 55 and 60% for decades (it was about 58% in this 
past election) and is normally an even more abysmal 36 – 38% in off-year, non-
presidential elections when most members of Congress and many state and local 
officials are elected.  Primary voting to pick party nominees is even lower.  The New 
York Times reported that of the 221 million eligible voters in 2016, only about 27% 
bother to vote in any of the party primaries.  Since their votes were divided among 
various candidates, in the end Trump received the votes from only about 6% of 
eligible voters; Clinton, a less fragmented primary, received the votes of 8% of 
Americans eligible to vote.lvi  Myriad theories purport to explain the low 
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participation of Americans in politics.  Many individualistic explanations focus on the 
inconvenient polling procedures, or propose attitudes that discourage voting (often 
these attitudinal explanations are contradictory: some claim voters are satisfied or 
else they would register their anger at the polls; others assert that 3M elections, 
reduced to choices of tweedledee and tweedledum (or tweedledumb and 
tweedledumber), alienate non-voters).  Political institutions pose numerous barriers 
to participation, such as onerous registration requirements, difficult ballot access for 
candidates and parties, lack of competitiveness in districts (including the Electoral 
College), rules disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes, etc.  Even systemic 
factors contribute to non-participation, especially growing economic inequality, 
especially in the face of failing working class institutions that might mobilize this vote, 
and lack of social capital, that is, the growing isolation of life in American 
communities.   
 After a century of extending the franchise to groups such as women, 
minorities, and youth, many attribute low turnout more to lack of positive attraction to 
voting (“pull”) than to negative exclusion (“push”).  In recent years, however, 
especially Republican level constituencies have begun erecting new barriers to 
voting, requiring photo identification or proof of citizenship to register, for example, or 
making casting ballots more difficult, for example, by denying college students the 
right to vote where they study instead of in their hometowns.  Although enacted in the 
name of protecting the integrity of elections, there is no evidence of significant 
corruption in the American electoral machinery.  Instead, these restrictions appear to 
be motivated by a desire to rig the rules for partisan advantage, and unlike older 
research that indicated no significant difference in the political preferences between 
voters and non-voters, recent research has unearthed evidence that those excluded 
from the political process come mainly from less privileged classes and have views 
that are well to the left of voters.  The “gaping hole” in the American electorate, then, 
seems to impel a significant tilt to the right in American politics.  These findings 
match shocking new research by Martin Gilens and other political scientist that find 
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that majority preferences match government policies only when there is a broad 
consensus within public opinion, but when preferences of the affluent divulge from 
the majority’s, the desires of affluent are determinative rather than the preferences of 
the majority, who have virtually no influence on policies.lvii     
   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In asking “how did we get here?”, Jonathan Kirsher offers three insightful 
answers: 1) “The Republicans did it”: the crack up of the awkwardly implausible 
Republican coalition opened a  path to victory for the most inexperienced and 
unanchored candidate in living memory; 2) “The internet did it”:  decentralized and 
direct media lacked the normal checks and balances that usually restrains the more 
emotional and extreme elements of the public; and 3) “The plutocracy did it”: 
exaggerated inequality and  policies favoring the elite generates backlash and 
rebellion in the hinterland.lviii  I have been suggesting a different conclusion: that the 
surprising election of Donald Trump reveals the decadence of American democratic 
institutions.  The pluralist democracy of elite competition characterizing American 
polyarchy for the generation after WWII has been hollowed out and severely 
weakened by neoliberal capitalism since the mid-1970s. The country retains a 
democratic façade of elections and civil liberties, but this “thin” model of liberal 
democracy is not sufficient to deal with the pressing national problems, especially in 
face of globalization, turn to neoliberal economic policies and patterns of 
development, and the growing economic inequality with resultant social stresses and 
problems.  
 
 
 
SHADES OF THE SOLID SOUTH 
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 Many people have compared Trump to Mussolini; despite his personal 
authoritarianism, there is no evidence so far that he has fascist leanings.  A 
comparison with Silvio Berlusconi seems more apt, given their mutual wealth and 
media careers.  I find Trump more reminiscent of the worst of traditional Southern 
politicians, evoking shades of the buffoons, demagogues, and charlatans that stalked 
the Southern landscape until the late twentieth century. These extremists, clowns, 
and con artists claimed to be champions of the “forgotten man,” but most simply 
provided the have-nots with a sideshow that diverted attention from the region’s 
pressing problems and masked policies that benefited the haves. Much has changed 
about the region’s institutional matrix that produced these pathological politics, but 
troubling continuities persist. Although the worst defects of traditional Southern 
politics have been remedied, countervailing trends have reshaping our national 
political system in ways that produced an eerie resemblance to the worst pathologies 
of Southern politics of a bygone era.lix  The South’s party system was weak; now our 
national parties have decayed.  Southern politics was driven by white supremacy; 
Trumpian America is displaying shocking levels of prejudice and chauvinism.  And 
while traditional Southern elites deliberately disenfranchised blacks and poor whites 
to maintain their grip on the region, the gaping hole in our national electorate allows 
American’s current political Establishment to rule.  Rather than being the source of 
America’s political problems, Donald Trump is the symptom of a deeper malady.  We 
need to fundamentally reform our political institutions and practices or else Trump 
could be merely the first of future pathological responses to popular frustrations.  
Without revamping our politics, we risk becoming what the South was during its 
darker days: a facade of popular rule, a veneer of formal civil liberties and elections, 
but lacking any genuine democracy.   
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